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The review focuses on Saulius Geniusas’ book, The Phenomenology of Pain. In this study, Geniusas de-
velops his own systematic phenomenology of the experience of pain, based primarily on the conceptual 
resources of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. In doing so, the philosopher formulates and success-
fully implements original methodological principles of “dialogical phenomenology.” Such a phenome-
nology consists of, on the one hand, strict phenomenological analysis of pain based on the methods of 
epoché, phenomenological reduction and eidetic variation, and on the other hand, of actual and partly 
polemical inclusion of phenomenological point of view in the ongoing discussion of pain in the social 
and biological sciences. The author manages to do this by supplementing his eidetic analysis of the es-
sence of pain experience with the method of “factual variations” and by appealing to the analytical op-
tics of Husserl’s late genetic phenomenology. This way the book reflects—on strictly phenomenological 
grounds—numerous findings from the sociology and biology of pain. The book relies on the tradition 
of phenomenological research, offers a conceptual reconstruction of the key dispute about pain that 
took place in this tradition (between Franz Brentano and Carl Stump) and, in its turn, grounds the 
positive sciences of pain in the direct evidence of experience itself.
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Обзор посвящен монографическому исследованию Саулюса Гениусаса «Феноменоменология 
боли». В монографии Гениусас разрабатывает собственную систематическую феноменологию 
опыта боли, основываясь, прежде всего, на концептуальных ресурсах феноменологии Эдмунда 
Гуссерля. При этом философ формулирует и успешно реализует оригинальные методологиче-
ские принципы «диалогической феноменологии», то есть с одной стороны, строгого феноме-
нологического анализа боли, основанного на методах эпохе, феноменологической редукции 
и эйдетической вариации, с другой стороны, актуального и отчасти полемического включения 
феноменологической точки зрения в ту продолжающуюся дискуссию о боли, которая идет в со-
циальных и биологических науках. Автору удается это сделать благодаря тому, что он допол-
няет свой эйдетический анализ сущности болевого опыта методом «фактической вариации», 
а также апеллирует к аналитической оптике поздней генетической феноменологии Гуссерля. 
Таким образом, в  книге осмысляются — строго на феноменологических принципах — мно-
гочисленные результаты социологии и биологии боли. Книга фундирована в традиции фено-
менологического исследования боли, предлагает концептуальную реконструкцию того ключе-
вого спора о боли, который в ней состоялся (между Карлом Штумпфом и Францем Брентано) 
и сама, в свою очередь, предлагает позитивным наукам о боли фундаментальную опору в виде 
непосредственных свидетельств самого опыта. 
Ключевые слова: феноменология, эйдетика, боль, интенциональность, стратифицированный 
опыт, ощущение, чувство.
Substituting the notion of time with the notion of pain in the celebrated saying 
of Augustine, Saulius Geniusas begins his investigation1, and the Augustinian struggle 
to express the seemingly inexpressible is both difficult and crucial. It is necessary for 
theoretical and empirical reasons. Geniusas focuses mainly on the theoretical ones, al-
though occasionally his book also deals with the therapeutic implications that follow 
1 Saulius Geniusas’ book “The Phenomenology of Pain” is based on his articles published in the 
2010s dealing with various aspects of the phenomenology of pain experience, articles reworked into 
a monograph, such as: (Geniusas, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2017a, 2017b).
330 VITALIY LEKHTSIER
from his theoretical considerations. Pain, and especially chronic pain, is still a curse of 
our time, an embarrassing dilemma for medical professionals and a stigma in every-
day communication (Craig, 2009). Due to the joint efforts of various pain studies over 
the last fifty years it has been acknowledged that pain is much more than a biomedical 
problem, that biomedicine has no monopoly over pain analysis, that we need to open 
a dialogue between all the sciences that are in one way or another concerned with pain 
investigations (Morris, 1993; Khaidarova, 2013). 
Yet despite this acknowledgement, which we come across in philosophy as well 
as social and human sciences, Simon van Rysewyk, the editor of a rather recent an-
thology, Meanings of Pain, remarks that “preference for neurobiology continues to 
overshadow research and clinical attention to psychosocial factors of pain such as 
meaning” (Rysewyk, 2016, 2). The conventional definition of pain that was offered 
by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) in 1979 and that is to 
this day approved by World Health Organization is criticized from time to time in 
philosophy and interdisciplinary studies2. According to this definition, pain is an “un-
pleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue 
damage, or described in terms of such damage” (as cited in Rysewyk, 2016, 1).
Geniusas also criticizes this definition, but his critique relies on phenomeno-
logical reasons: because this definition mixes apples and oranges by unjustifiably 
combining physicalist discourse with appeal to experience and especially because 
this definition does not clarify the specific character of pain experience. According 
to Geniusas, the nature of pain as experience has not been defined successfully either 
in the sciences or in philosophy, despite the repeated attempts to do this. The domi-
nant methodological paradigms in pain studies—naturalism and social construction-
ism—dwell only on mechanisms leading to pain and forming it (the neurological and 
cultural mechanisms accordingly), but say nothing about pain itself (Geniusas, 2020, 
145–151). These approaches uncritically and unjustifiably assume that we already 
know what pain is. Sociology and biology of pain must be founded in the analysis of 
pain as experience, and this grounding analysis must be undertaken by phenomenol-
ogy, which traditionally legitimizes itself though the task of founding other analytic 
approaches, which neglect reliance on immediate data. 
Methodologically, Geniusas offers an investigation that is based on classical 
Husserlian phenomenology and considers his own investigation a supplement to those 
rather sporadic phenomenology-oriented studies of pain that were published during 
2 The history of this definition, its criticism and the alternative pain definition suggestion see here: 
(Cohen, Quintner & Rysewyk, 2018). 
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the last two decades and were based on Martin Heidegger’s existential analytics and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body (Grüny, 2004; Olivier, 2007). 
Yet Geniusas is the first to have developed a systematic phenomenology of pain, which 
has never existed before the publication of this book as far as its conceptual scale and 
empirical base are concerned. His systematic approach is grounded in the resources of 
Husserl’s conceptual-analytical framework. On the one hand, this framework allows 
us to escape naturalistic objectivations. On the other hand, it equips us with a method 
for direct phenomenological description, directed at the phenomenon’s essence in the 
eidetic variation, as it manifests itself in embodied experience. It also enables us—due 
to the notion of the Lebenswelt—to clarify in what ways pain is rooted in cultural 
worlds. On the whole Geniusas’ book is characterized by continuous detailed argu-
mentation and clarification of the methodological steps taken in analysis: the choice 
of Husserlian methodology, the reasons why it is most relevant for the subject of his 
research, his own definition of pain, the solution to the Carl Stumpf—Franz Brentano 
long-standing debate over the nature of pain, etc.
I would like to point out that that author’s reference to the Husserlian tradition 
has not prevented him from developing his own methodological position, which is in 
a good sense ambivalent, or “oxymoronic”. His methodological approach is both fair 
to phenomenology and in some ways even too rigorously subscribes to the “die-hard” 
phenomenological research identity, yet it also takes into account various theoretical 
results that reach us from other sciences, which do not deal with the epoché and the 
phenomenological reduction. “Phenomenology need not be victim of its own purity: 
it must be open to the developments in other sciences—natural, social, and human…” 
(Geniusas, 2020, 12). Geniusas calls such phenomenology “dialogical” (Geniusas, 
2020, 12).
I want to dwell upon these theses in detail, since the author makes systemat-
ic clarification of phenomenological pain analysis one of the main objectives of his 
book, which is definitely an advantage. What is meant by “dialogical phenomenology” 
here? Both words matter, of course. On the one hand, it is strictly a “pure” phenome-
nological study of pain. I mean that firstly, in light of its adherence to the epoché, the 
study stays clear of references to the biology and sociology of pain, to “tissue damage”, 
neurological explanations, or pain interpretation as a natural thing. Secondly, due to 
its adherence to the phenomenological reduction, the study treats pain within the im-
manent “field of pure experience” (Geniusas, 2020, 16), and thirdly, due to the eidetic 
variation—the study is concerned with the discovery of the essential and invariant 
structures of the Heraclitean stream of experience, without which the phenomenon 
would lose its identity. Adherence to these three principles in their unity prevents 
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phenomenology from “misappropriations,” for example from a common pain talk 
in the first-person perspective, from the paradigm of introspective psychologism, or 
from various idiosyncratic singular descriptions. This adherence also lets us access 
intersubjective and verified knowledge about the essence of pain experience, even if 
this essence cannot be “accurate” and cannot be defined comprehensively. 
As we know, “morphological” or non-ideal, “non-geometrical” essences, i.e., 
essences implying sensuous embodiment, cannot, according to Husserl, be strictly 
shaped in eidetic mind and are “essentially and non-randomly ambiguous” (Husserl, 
1999, 155). Thus, Geniusas dispels some stereotypes connected with phenomenology, 
including phenomenology of medicine, with its common criticism: as immersion into 
subjective pain experience, which allegedly cannot be corroborated intersubjectively, 
for instance in a doctor-patient relationship (Gergel, 2012). Nevertheless, while criti-
cizing phenomenology of medicine in one regard, Geniusas agrees with it in another—
that phenomenology must not become “sectarian polemic” (Gergel, 2012, 1103), that 
it must not be methodologically and thematically isolated, which would result in neg-
ative consequences for phenomenology itself. On the contrary, phenomenology must 
become dialogical, and this is the other side of the coin. If phenomenology is practiced 
in an isolated way, it can result in psychologization and dependence on the phenome-
nologist’s cognitive abilities, which would limit the possibilities of eidetic variation and 
provide the false assurance that experiential essences have already been understood. 
For example, if we want to include in our imaginative variation of the essence of sound 
or color synesthesia, which is mentioned in empirical science and which does not ex-
ist in our subjective experience, this would mean that we, phenomenologists, need a 
methodological permission for this action. Geniusas calls this permission principle a 
“factual variation,” and he maintains that it must supplement the eidetic one.
Actually, Husserl does not exclude factual variations from phenomenological 
analysis. On the contrary, in Ideas I, for instance, Husserl discusses the use of “objects 
of art, especially poetry” for the phenomenological understanding of essences, as far 
as this understanding concerns the practice of “conjuring up representative details” 
of an object, its free variation in mind, and here, according to Husserl, nothing can 
compare with poetry (Husserl, 1999, 146). For Geniusas this combination of eidetic 
with factual variations has the status of a pure opportunity and it opens the way to 
cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural dialogue with positive sciences, the arts and other 
research fields. More specifically, it deals with pain experience, which is so complex 
and varied, as it refers to a variety of experiences, which are not always tangible sub-
jectively—from pain dissociation syndromes (congenital insensitivity to pain, asym-
bolia for pain, etc.) to masochism. 
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Geniusas finishes his explication and description of the methodological prin-
ciples required for the phenomenology of pain with a thesis, which states that static, 
constitutive eidetics of pain should be combined with genetic eidetics. Such a supple-
mentation enables one to incorporate intuitions that rely on pre-conceptual under-
standing of pain. “Genetic considerations arise from the need to supplement the anal-
yses of being with reflections on becoming” (Geniusas, 2020, 33). Eidetics is open to 
diachrony, if we mean both ways of genetic optics, suggested by Husserl, and includ-
ing epoché and in this case transcendental reduction: the psychological way leading to 
the temporally structured contents of transcendental experience, to the sphere of the 
formation of apperceptions, and the ontological way through the appeal to Lebenswelt 
as an intentional correlate of transcendental intersubjectivity (Geniusas, 2020, 35). 
Genetic eidetics enables us to open a dialogue between phenomenology of pain and 
cultural anthropology of pain, psychopathology and other disciplines.
Geniusas offers the following definition of pain: “pain is an aversive bodily feel-
ing with a distinct experiential quality, which can be given only in original firsthand 
experience, either as a nonintentional feeling-sensation or as an intentional feeling” 
(Geniusas, 2020, 42). The author substantiates each element of this definition in the 
course of analytical descriptions and historical-philosophical reconstructions, in par-
ticular commenting on the historic debate about the nature of pain between Husserl’s 
teachers Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf3. The question behind this debate con-
cerned whether it was possible to consider pain to be an intentional experience or 
whether it was a plain empirical/material aspect of experience, which did not refer to 
anything. Brentano in his theory of emotions and affects maintained that pain was an 
intentional feeling (Brentano, 1996), whereas Stumpf, who is known to have been a 
follower of Brentano in many other regards, considered pain to be a non-intentional 
feeling-sensation (Gefühlsempfindung) (Stumpf, 1916, 1928). This debate within the 
phenomenological tradition did not reach any consensus: many phenomenological or 
phenomenology-oriented studies dealing with the nature of pain were in favor of ei-
ther Brentano’s (Olivier, 2007; Buytendijk, 1962) or Stumpf ’s position (Scarry, 1985). 
We can also see a personal “from…to” evolution as far as this problem is concerned, 
for example, in Max Scheler’s studies, who considered pain in his early works in ethics 
to be a non-intentional feeling, and in his later works to be a modality of suffering, 
understood as an intentional experience. 
3 For the history and twists and turns of this long-lasting indirect debate between Stumpf and Bren-
tano, the debate where the positions were specified, see here: (Fizette et. al., 2017)
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The phenomenological style of Geniusas’ analysis is characterized by regular 
systematic argumentation. The reader is offered detailed explications of conceptually 
incompatible and equally descriptively convincing arguments for both standpoints. 
For Stumpf, the interruption of intentional attitude in pain, distancing from objects, 
pre-reflective ambiguity of act and its object in pain experience, metaphoric reifica-
tion/objectification of pain in language etc; for Brentano, pain as a way to get to know 
your body and as a form of attitude to other objects, pain not only as noesis, but also 
as noema, etc. 
The book presents the thesis of the intentional nature of pain, including the 
consideration of its development after Brentano, in its full complexity. According to 
Geniusas, the intentionality of pain can be conceptualized in three ways: pain as an 
intentional feeling correlating with the body; pain as an intentional object (a body 
experiencing pain); and pain as a special atmosphere “coloring” all the intentional 
objects, which can be illustrated, for example, with the words of the Russian poet 
Vladislav Khodasevich: “And every sound is hard to hear, / And every ray for me is 
torture….” In my opinion, the third “variant” of pain intentionality can be understood 
as a modification of the first one. If we demystify the vague notion of “atmosphere” of 
its seemingly ontological status, which can be understood non-intentionally (Schmitz, 
2009, 23–27), then it can be said to concern pain as a sensual act, yet it will correlate 
not with the body where the pain is localized, but with any object being in the focus 
of “violated” attention (Olivier, 2007). 
On the whole, the Brentanian and Stumpfian positions being equally persuasive, 
Geniusas decides not to follow either of them but to provide reasons that underlie his 
proposed compromise solution: “pain is a stratified experience. This claim means that 
the experience of pain is composed of two fundamental strata: while its founding stra-
tum is non-intentional, the founded stratum is marked by intentionality” (Geniusas, 
2020, 44). Geniusas finds the theoretical resource for giving grounds to this reconciling 
solution in Husserl’s and Sartre’s works. In §15 of Husserl’s Fifth Logical Investigation, 
Husserl focuses on intentional and non-intentional feelings. Here Husserl mentions 
Gefühlsempfindungen and states that pain is not a feeling as act, that it “should not equal 
belief, guess, willingness etc., but such aspects of feelings as being rough and smooth 
[…] at best they represent the content or even the objects of intentions, but they are not 
intentions themselves” (Husserl, 2001, 367–368). Itself not being an act, pain and other 
similar “content of feelings” “undergo object ‘interpretation’ or ‘grasping.’ So, they are 
not acting themselves, but acts are constituted through them…” (Husserl, 2001, 367)
This position, which is usually mentioned in philosophical studies to support 
Stumpf ’s views, underlies Geniusas’ view that there is a specific conceptual pros-
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pect—an opportunity to understand pain as an ontologically two-edged phenomenon, 
i.e., both as a pure feeling and an intentional object (constituted in inner perception, 
with the help of localization, for example). In the first case we deal with pain as a 
simple phenomenon, in the second case (i.e., after its intentional transformation), as 
a complex, stratified phenomenon. However, these types of pain experience correlate 
not according to the principle of juxtaposition but according to founding relations. If 
pain is experienced intentionally (and according to Husserl it can also be experienced 
non-intentionally), this non-intentionality does not have to be represented (as Bren-
tano thought) but can be based on feelings which function as “representing content.” 
In addition, the simplicity of the pain phenomenon (pain as Gefühlsempfindung) 
gives ground to the issue (mentioned above in the definition of pain as “the original 
first-hand experience”) that pain can be given only directly, as a personal immanent 
and indubitable embodied sensation, comprised in the actual content of experience. 
Therefore, this experience can be non-thematic, pre-reflexive, passive, if we mean the 
experience of pain in the background, i.e., weak and short pain, which one puts up 
with and which one might not notice. Pain becomes thematic when there is an inten-
tional transformation, through which it acquires noetic and noematic characteristics; 
it happens, in particular, when pain becomes strong, excruciating and long-lasting: 
“The more obtrusive the pain, the more it has the tendency to change its character and 
transform itself into an intentional experience” (Geniusas, 2020, 60). The reflexive 
objectifying modification of the basic pain experience happens in the mind forcefully 
and unintentionally. 
Sartre undertook an analytical description of pain as a complex, hierarchical 
experience in the third part of Being and Nothingness, in the chapter Body, where he 
considered the reference to the phenomenon of “physical” pain (douleur) a paradig-
matic example for the phenomenology of the body, or the embodied subject. Sartre 
also uses the notion of “levels” while describing pain experience. At the first, basic, 
level, pain is given in the “unanimity of ‘experience’ and ‘living’,” it is lived as a feeling 
in “your body”, as a “pure affective quality” (Sartre, 2002, 334, 349, 350) At this level 
of “nonthetical self-consciousness” “pain is completely free from intentionality”, it is 
the embodied subjectivity itself and in plain experiencing causes suffering, but it is 
elusive (Sartre, 2002, 349, 351). At the second level, reflection renders pain a psychic 
phenomenon (mal), which has its manifestation and which begins to live its own life. 
Like a living being, it comes and goes, forming a “tune” of suffering. Noematically, at 
this level we experience the so called “animism of pain” (Sartre, 2002, 355). Finally, the 
third level is introduced by the alienating “for another” structure, which brings about 
the knowledge of our body, as it is given to others. We thereby acquire “our disease”: 
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“we transfer pain to Disease… another person is responsible for my disease” (Sartre, 
2002, 374). At this level the experience of pain includes the mechanisms of the alien-
ating body-for-another, i.e., mechanisms of feeling “acquisition” and mechanisms of 
“anticipation”: “a suffering body is a basis, material for alienating meanings which 
anticipate it…” (Sartre, 2002, 373). 
Despite the fact that Sartre reconstructs intentional levels of pain experience 
in a way which is rather different from Geniusas’, Sartre’s pattern serves a ground in 
promoting the thesis of pain as a complex and stratified phenomenon. Meanwhile, 
such spacious metaphors as levels, strata, layers can certainly set up naturalizing traps 
during analysis. However, bearing this in mind, it must be admitted that it is hard to 
think of better working notions to describe the constitutive processes which organize 
pain experience. 
The conceptual idea of pain experience as stratified and aversive and at the same 
time different from other unpleasant experiences (i.e., possessing a “special empiric 
quality”) is tested by the author when he turns to various data of factual variation, first 
of all those coming from cognitive science of pain, describing, in particular, dissocia-
tion pain syndromes—congenital insensitivity to pain, lobotomized, cingulotomized, 
and morphinized patients, and threat hypersymbolia. Geniusas argues, for example, 
that the first of the above-mentioned symptoms proves that pain experience cannot 
be replaced with pain behavior, that “sensory dimension is fundamental to pain ex-
perience,” that “there must be something about pain sensations themselves that mo-
tivates consciousness to apperceive them as painful” and to combine different pain 
sensations (fulgurant, lancinating, pounding, severe, throbbing pain etc.) into “whole 
pain experience” (Geniusas, 2020, 73, 74, 79) with a distinctive characteristic. In other 
cases, pathological block of “transition” from pain as a sensation to pain as an inten-
tional object shows the structural presence of such transition in stratified experience. 
However, it seems that analyzing the data of this factual variation the author 
does not consider them as milestones to the eidetic definition of pain which is still to 
be acquired, but evaluates them from the position of the already given definition. For 
this reason, some conclusions in the discussion with cognitivists are not absolutely 
flawless. 
For example, the phenomenon of threat hypersymbolia (when pain is experi-
enced without noxious stimulation and painful sensations), might invert the notion 
of founding relations in pain experience if they had not been defined already. In the 
next chapters, while considering the issue of the subject of pain experience, the author 
introduces the notion of the lived-body (Leib), which clarifies the notion of sensation 
from the phenomenological point of view. This clarification complicates the picture 
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of founding in pain experience. Besides, I find it very important that Geniusas takes 
such a risk, does not discard awkward facts, but on the contrary, deals with the issue 
that can question his own conception of the essence of pain experience. He actual-
ly introduces the phenomenological point of view into the broad discussion that we 
come across in various sciences, thereby suggesting that we recognize not only the 
biological but also the phenomenological meaning in these phenomena. 
Meanwhile, it is most likely that the author needs these supplements and the 
dialogue with specific sciences not only for the phenomenological founding of these 
sciences but also for the correction or at least problematization of the already existing 
traditional phenomenological concepts. For instance, while discussing the phenom-
enon of somatizing (description of psychic distress “in the language” of somatic com-
plaints) and psychologizing (manifestation of physical pain in the idiom of psychic 
complaints) and outlining the prospect of their interpretation in Husserl’s theory of 
the life-world, Geniusas problematizes Husserl’s idea of Heimwelt. There must be some 
reasons that explain how somatic phenomena can transfigure themselves into psychic 
phenomena, and vice versa (this happens with somatization and psychologization, and 
these transformations are typical not only for the period of chronic diseases). Cultural 
anthropology suggests that a “sufferer misrepresents the nature” of their experience, 
that through somatizing and psychologizing (Geniusas, 2020, 168) processes, the suf-
ferer reinterprets and disguises their experience, that is, the sufferer legitimizing some 
forms of expression and delegitimizing others, in conformity with what is acceptable 
in this or that society. In his turn the phenomenologist relies on such notions as the 
lived-body and embodied personhood, which let him explain the connection of pain as 
a somatic sensation and pain as an intentional feeling. He also has the genetic notion 
of intersubjective life-world, within which such disguising “pre-reflective modes of 
expression” can be explained (Geniusas, 2020, 180). However, what shall we do, asks 
Geniusas, with Husserl’s concept of Heimwelt as a homogeneous world of concord-
ant experiences (einstimmige Erfahrungen)? Husserl understands the “homeworld” 
not only as a cognitive construction, as a combination of what is accustomed and 
familiar, “the area of the closest familiarity” (Landgrebe, 2018, 277), but also as “the 
feeling of homeness,” family connection, i.e., emotional intimacy, togetherness, which 
is intuitively projected at the togetherness of family, tribe or nation. Common cas-
es of somatization and psychologization indicate that our accustomed and familiar 
home worlds can include discord, stigmatization, the delegitimizing of specific forms 
of experiential expression, therefore its living can include, according to Geniusas, the 
“feeling of homelessness” penetrating “personal worlds.” Even if we take into account 
the Husserlian notion of Heimwelt as a pure transcendental-constitutive intersubjec-
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tivity model, where such conflicts do not take place, we will still have to agree with 
Geniusas that this model of verification and traditionally understood eidetics of the 
“home world” becomes problematic and require further elucidation. 
Geniusas’ phenomenological style is not only marked by aspiration to maxi-
mum argumentation, but also by an amazing combination of a strict systematic and 
taxonomic writing, on the one hand, and regular polemics, on the other hand. Every-
where the book offers us classifications and typologies of concepts, possible solutions 
to this or that problem, and one of them is always phenomenological. Every chapter 
outlines its polemical targets. For instance, bringing the topic of possible reconcilia-
tion of two motives—the feeling of pain absolutism (its “inner” presence) and at the 
same time its experiencing as something localized (its “outer” presence), Geniusas at 
once introduces and describes six available theoretical solutions to this paradox. Here 
we will repeat neither these ways, nor their criticisms, but the important thing is that 
in this book, the phenomenological solution is always grounded (and this is logical) as 
the most adequate solution since it is grounded in the evidence of experience. 
To conceptualize this evidence Geniusas refers to Husserl’s phenomenology of 
the lived-body (Leib), as described first of all in Ideas II, i.e., to the understanding of 
the lived-body (or the embodied consciousness) as the field of sensings, to the notion 
of Empfindnis, which refers to special sensations experienced as localized “inside” the 
lived-body, and to those consequences, which result from Husserl phenomenology of 
the lived-body as a twofold constitutive unity: pain as “inner protest against its consti-
tutive appropriation” (Geniusas, 2020, 121). The issue how pain can be simultaneous-
ly absolute and unattended (lived in the background) brings the author to the topic 
of different forms of pain temporality, of immanent memories and their pre-percep-
tual influence on its intensity. This directly refers to the phenomenon of chronic pain 
and to its treatment in medical institutions. Phenomenology of pain thereby acquires 
therapeutic significance.
The author also relies on some of Husserl’s theses from Ideas II in his analysis of 
the subject of pain. This subject is not just a lived-body or embodied consciousness, 
it is rather the person, who undergoes the processes of depersonalization and re-per-
sonalization while experiencing chronic pain. Depersonalization is a disturbance of 
accustomed self-understanding, a relation to one’s body, to the outer world and other 
people. However, persons can reorganize their personality anew with their unavoid-
able reaction to chronic pain (the reaction being cognitive, emotional and corporeal). 
Actually, this consideration of chronic pain, its phenomenological description, 
its demarcation from other types of pain (transient and acute) is a great achievement 
of the book. Chronic pain is an “invisible epidemic” of our life, as David Morris has 
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rightly pointed out (Morris, 1993, 57). Chronic pain, which remains after it has per-
formed its alarm function, the pain which has become a pathology (Leriсhе, 1961) and 
is the most typical disease of our time, this chronic pain still “challenges” us—it chal-
lenges both our understanding and medical institutions and practices (Good et. al., 
1994). Geniusas is absolutely right to say that chronic pain brings into question the 
opposition between psychogenic and physical understanding of pain mechanisms, or 
as a lot of other researchers state, demonstrates the pain monism. However, Geniusas 
believes in his usual polemical mode that chronic pain also brings into question other 
distinctions at work in the phenomenology of medicine nowadays—the distinctions 
between illness and disease, healing and curing. He writes that “these distinctions, in-
troduced ‘to provide the phenomenology of medicine with its raison d’être’, have out-
lived their function and that, presently, they leave phenomenology with an artificially 
confined domain that it sooner or later must transgress” (Geniusas, 2020, 155–156). 
This is a bold statement which needs further discussion. I would just like to say 
that the principal differentiation between “illness” and “disease,” i.e., a health problem 
as a subjective experience and a health problem as a nosological category, is unlikely 
to have become out-of-date. It was grounded, first of all, by Leon Eisenberg and Ar-
thur Kleinman (Eisenberg, 1977; Kleinman, 1988, 14) for medical practice itself, in 
order to deal with the conflict of interpretations between the medical semiotics of a 
health problem and the meanings given to the patient during patient-doctor interac-
tions. This differentiation is especially important in “the remission society” (Frank, 
1997, 8), for which the most important problem of pain experience is connected with 
the issue of what happens to chronic patients outside the doctor’s offices. It does not 
mean that phenomenology should not deal with such a phenomenon as disease. What 
is more, the diagnosis establishment is an issue which is relevant for phenomenol-
ogy, especially social phenomenology. Nevertheless, the phenomenological study of 
illness and chronic pain as illness is to be continued. It is no accident that Geniusas 
also mentions narrative medicine and even traces together with it the “phenomenol-
ogy of listening,” and the grounding for narrative medicine. Its ethical and therapeu-
tic meaning is impossible without the differentiation between “illness” and “disease” 
(Lekhtsier, 2018). 
Geniusas’ book, The Phenomenology of Pain, is extremely informative. The au-
thor has studied a great number of works in phenomenology, anthropology, neurolo-
gy, cultural studies, medical psychology and other sciences. All the results of biology 
and sociology of pain that are referred to in this book are incorporated into the phe-
nomenological eidetics of pain while relying on all the necessary methodological pro-
cedures, based on immediate evidence of experience. From my point of view, the book 
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clarifies many principal issues connected with the phenomenology of pain. It is also 
its great merit that it outlines new prospects for a dialogue between phenomenology 
and the positivistic sciences of pain. The latter do not always refer to phenomenology 
as a methodological resource, of course, as it is done, for example, by an American 
anthropologist Byron Good, who introduces the notion of the “world of chronic pain” 
in his studies (Good, 1994, 123)4. Let us agree with Geniusas that phenomenology 
should always follow its mission of philosophically grounding the sciences in experi-
ence. 
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